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Data breaches are occurring at an unprecedented rate. Between June 2019 and 
early October 2020, over 564 data breaches affected over 36.6 million patients as 
posted to the United States Federal government HITECH portal. These patients are 
at risk for having their identities stolen or sold on alternative marketplaces. Some 
healthcare entities are working to manage privacy and security risks to their opera-
tions, research, and patients. However, many have some procedures and policies 
in place, with few (if any) centrally managing all their infrastructure risks. For 
example, many healthcare organizations are not tracking or updating all the known 
and potential concerns and elements into a centralized repository following indus-
try best practice timetables for auditing and insurance quantification. This chapter 
examines known and potential problems in healthcare information technology and 
discusses a new open source risk management standardized framework library to 
improve the coordination and communication of the aforementioned problematic 
management components. The healthcare industry would benefit from adopting 
such a standardized risk-centric framework.
Keywords: risk associated with computer communications, healthcare,  
data breaches, GDPR, HITECH, HIPAA, standardized risk library, risk management, 
patient information, identity theft, cybersecurity, laws, penetration test,  
risk assessments, insurance
1. Introduction
Across the globe, data security is becoming more regulated. For example, in 
the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) protects 
its citizens [1]. In China, the Cybersecurity Law of 2017 was one of the first well 
known laws passed to protect the data and communications of its citizens [2]. In 
the United States of America, medical entities in the country’s critical infrastruc-
ture are covered under Federal laws to protect patient information. Specifically, 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [3] and Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) [4] are 
Federal-level regulations for covered entities that secure patient-protected health 
information (PHI). PHI covers a gamut of different identifiers and includes patient 
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names, birthdays, social security numbers, medical record numbers, license plate 
numbers, biometric data, among a few others. The digital form of PHI is electronic 
PHI or ePHI. In the United States, vendors and services which are not covered 
under HIPAA (perhaps because they do not bill patients for services rendered) are 
regulated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and must self-report health data 
breaches to the FTC [5]. Furthermore, the European Commission officially ratified 
the final version of the GDPR to include notification from a breached supervisory 
authority to be made within 72 hours (or provide reasons for a delay) [1].
In the United States, both HIPAA-covered and non-covered entities may 
also be under other legal requirements, such as non-disclosure, confidentiality 
restrictions, or other security requirements, for other organizational, research, or 
employee data.
The management within covered groups has historically remained siloed 
intra-organization where different components of the organizational risk are being 
managed and decisions made by different units within the organizations without a 
standardized and well-connected systematic methodology. For example, the legal, 
audit, budget, health informatics, security, privacy, medical, and information 
systems teams may all be disjointly managed, causing frustrations in adequately 
quantifying and coordinating the organizational risks. In such disjoint cases, an 
exception to an organizational policy may result in unidentified operational risk if 
the different departments are not consistently coordinated and periodically review-
ing, perhaps updating, the associated risks.
This chapter begins by describing data breach risks in HIPAA-covered entities 
as reported to the United States government that cause patients higher risks for 
identity theft. Then it integrates current research into building a standardized 
risk assessment library that enables both inter- and intra-organizational risk 
coordination. This design facilitates standardizing and communicating risks 
as well as reasonable internal statistics related to technical and administrative 
limitations, organizational policy exceptions, and federal legal requirements 
to inform the business, auditors, insurance companies, and business associates 
of risks.
2. Patient information data breaches can lead to patient identity theft
In the United States, citizens are protected by federal, state, and potentially 
smaller sub-state regulations. Each industry sector are potentially under unique 
legal and other sector-specific requirements. In fact, today most, if not all, states 
have different personally identifying information (PII) legislation. Historically, 
these laws are not well understood and are written in most cases by non-technical 
writers. As such, the legal and technical specifications have gaps both in under-
standing and in the feasibility of current technological constraints.
2.1 Entities covered under HIPAA
HIPAA requires at least three covered groups, referred to by the law as 
Covered Entities, to protect health information. Examples of covered entities are: 
healthcare providers, health Plans, and business associates. Healthcare providers 
transmit electronic patient information in connection with a Health and Human 
Services (HHS)-adopted standard transaction. Health plans include insurance 
companies, health maintenance organizations (HMOs), corporate health plans, 
and government programs. Business associates are external groups/organizations 
that perform activities or services on ePHI on behalf of another group covered 
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under HIPAA. Figure 1 [6] shows one year of reports by covered entity to the 
Office of Civil Rights (OCR).
2.2 Risks in HIPAA-covered entities
Research at large has studied risk management of medical information [7–10], 
but not specifically as related by different HIPAA-covered domains. Recent research 
[6, 7, 11] explores potential concerns for each legally covered segment based on self-
report to the US Government as required by the HITECH Act. In the sector-specific 
threat probability-specific research [6, 7, 11] over a one-year interval, the research 
showed that different the different domains may indeed have different sources of 
concerns and issues. For example, healthcare providers and business associates 
have reportedly different higher probability of concerns to alleviate than health 
plan entities, as shown in Figure 2 [6]. This indicates that the different domains 
may need to manage their threats differently by perhaps investing more heavily in 
different mitigating controls.
2.3 Data breaches reported to the HHS OCR across the USA
The HHS unauthorized data release portal provides the number of affected 
individuals from the cybersecurity events for each self-reported or discovered data 
release. Figure 3 [6] shows states across the USA with the most reported individu-
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one-year interval, each state may be equally likely to have higher counts depending 
on the released data size. Further research is needed to determine state likelihood.
2.4 Reported data breach counts per state sorted by number of reports
Another element tracked on the HHS portal is the presence of business associ-
ate agreements (BAA). A provider enters into a BAA with an outside party when 
an outside party receives access to the provider’s ePHI. A properly written BAA 
somewhat “protects” the provider if the outside party breaches the ePHI. Figure 4 
[6] shows state BAA presence notated with by the HHS portal with either a “yes” or 
“no.” The portal reports are not described, so the research below shows the categori-
cal data as posted to the portal.
3. Risk assessment literature and standards
Risk management has been slowly moving into industry. In the United States, 
HIPAA mandates risk assessment be in place prior to new technology’s being 
integrated into an organization.
Recently, in October 2020, Eddy and Perlrotha [12] reported on a cyber-attack 
that resulted in a patient death. The attack occurred when “ransomware invaded 
Figure 3. 
OCR breached individuals by state.
Figure 4. 
OCR-covered entities investigated BAA by state.
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30 servers at University Hospital Düsseldorf [,…] crashing systems and forcing 
the hospital to turn away emergency patients.” This is one of the first ransomware-
attack-related suspected deaths reported publicly. In such a high-profile and morbid 
case, we can see the essential importance for having a standardized language for 
discussing cyber-risks.
3.1 Risk assessment standards
The United States National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST) has 
produced many Special Publications on Risk Assessments [13]. Figures 5 and 6 [14] 
show NIST’s generic risk model and risk assessment process respectively. In fact, many 
organizations around the world are following the NIST Risk Assessment frameworks.
3.2 Automating risk assessments
Risk assessment automation has been proposed in the form of automated pen-
etration testing frameworks [9–11, 13–19]. Testing frameworks and automated tools 
are extremely useful for detecting known bugs and vulnerabilities. However, in gen-
eral, these tools do not report on the larger risk-assessment picture. Specifically, they 
may not accurately report on legal requirements or help an organization prepare for 
prospective data-breach-associated costs. In addition, there is limited (if any) lan-
guage standardization on risk findings to enable intra- and inter-organizational risk 
communication, which is essential for subsequent auditing and legal ramifications.
3.3 Framework libraries for malware and software developments
In addition to developing a standardized framework, NIST and MITRE.org 
have worked tirelessly to produce a standardized dictionary for attack and mal-
ware. For example, they have produced the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration 
and Classification (CAPEC) [20] to classify attacks. NIST maintains the National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD) [21] to identify products with well-known vulnerabili-
ties. In addition to attacks, these organizations are iteratively developing vulnerabil-
ity dictionaries. For example, MITER sponsors the Common Weakness Enumeration 
(CWE) [22] and NIST sponsors the Bug Framework (BF) [23, 24]). These standard-
ized frameworks are purposefully agnostic to vendors, languages, and industry 
sectors. They have been instrumental and essential for industry, government, and 
Figure 5. 
NIST’s generic risk model with key risk factors.
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academia to discuss and communicate software vulnerabilities, assurances, and 
development techniques. As humans need a standard spoken dictionary to commu-
nicate with each other on day-to-day activities, so do they need a similar dictionary 
to discuss technical activities.
3.4 Penetration testing reports
As risk management is still clearly its own type of innovation phase within the 
technology adoption life-cycle, risk researchers are finding a need to communicate 
risk through standardized language. For example, let us consider a penetration 
test report. Historically, there is none of the following: (1) a fixed template, (2) a 
fixed-strategy, or (3) fixed-finding language. Such non-standardization is subject to 
extreme bias and misrepresentation. In fact, if every internal or external penetra-
tion test is written differently, how can any organization fully understand their 
own risks? Similarly, if every employee in an organization spoke their own verbal 
language, how could anything be communicated? Historically, industry has focused 
on standardizing software vulnerabilities and malicious code patterns. A major 
gap still exists for risk management components, including budgeting for financial 
penalties and legal ramifications.
3.5 Risk assessment education
Research on risk-assessment education has primarily focused on learning pen-
etration testing techniques [25]. The curriculums discussed in this research neither 
considers the meta-organizational risk nor risks specifically associated with the 
medical sector. Schmeelk [26] fills a literature gap by emphasizing that all the risk 
components should be strategically aligned in terms of standardization.
4. Risk assessment library considerations
Managing the risk in a medical setting is unique because of specific regulations 
that come with significant potential financial fines and corrective actions. For 
example, outside and inside risk management strategies may not properly align. Also, 
many organizations, especially in healthcare, are employing a task-based ticketing 
system to track internal processes. These ticketing systems enable the Information 
Figure 6. 
NIST risk assessment process.
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System silos and other organizational risk components to entirely misalign and 
improperly manage risk by using neither standardized nor repeatable language.
Schmeelk [26] reports that the following five subsections should be included 
in identifying organizational components. As a centralized library has yet to be 
created, a working group should focus on exactly what to include in a standardized 
public-risk-assessment language dictionary. Important historical components are: 
legal, training, vendor, and system security requirements, as well as organizational 
controls. A standardized risk-finding library encourages cross-organizational 
collaboration, communication, auditing, and legal consistency if a case ever goes 
to court.
4.1 Regulatory requirements
Regulatory requirements encompass a wide range of organizational responsibili-
ties, which can be actual governmental laws and/or industry-specific requirements. 
Let us discuss both.
4.1.1 Industry-specific regulations
In the United States, medical critical infrastructure entities have both sector-
specific regulatory requirements as well as other requirements, such as Payment 
Card Industry (PCI)-compliance, to consider in risk management [27]. If an 
organization does not pass PCI (re)compliance auditing, then they are at risk of 
losing the use of credit cards, among other payment sources under PCI regulations. 
In the past, organizations would consider themselves a cash-only facility if they lost 
PCI (re)compliance. Today, with the birth of cryptocurrencies and alternative pay-
ment methods not under PCI, losing the use of credit cards might not be as drastic 
as it has been historically. Other regulations include compliance with those from 
the International Standards Organization (ISO). Globally, there are many industry-
specific regulations that are not necessarily enforceable laws.
4.1.2 Industry-specific Laws
Medical-covered entities under HIPAA/HITECH are subject to audits by the 
United States Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Civil Rights (OCR). 
The OCR manages many civil rights across the United States in addition to HIPAA. 
Organizational breaches of patient electronic health information of over 500 
individuals must be reported to the OCR as ruled in HITECH. Such breaches are 
both subject to federal fines and corrective actions. The OCR also can audit covered 
entities at any point in time. HIPAA is a very well-organized law. It has specific 
mandates for electronic health data requirements, which should be consistently 
mapped during a risk assessment to appropriately manage organizational risk. HHS 
lists many documents for guidance on their website, including mappings between 
NIST frameworks for cybersecurity and HIPAA requirements. These are extremely 
useful resources for practitioners.
4.2 Training requirements
Security education and training awareness (SETA) needs may occur at the 
vendor level or as federal, state, or city regulations. They are not only legally man-
dated in many instances for legal responsibilities, but also are ethical mitigations. 
For example, employing staff who have not been properly trained on data security 
and then holding them responsible for data security mistakes is unethical. In fact, 
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in such a case, labor laws may also be violated. Also, in New York State, the loss of 
employee Social Security Numbers (SSN) through any sort of data breach is a crime 
subject to legal penalties [28].
4.2.1 Regulation trainings
Different regulations require different levels of SETA. In the credit card indus-
try, organizations using alternatives to cash which are highly-corporately regulated 
must protect the data by complying with the Payment Card Industry (PCI) regu-
lation. The PCI Data Security Standard (DSS) requires software developers for 
services using credit cards to be properly trained to code such systems. In addition, 
federal laws such as HIPAA also have specific training requirements. Lastly, little 
work on cybersecurity training is being done at state or city levels; however, proper 
awareness could be suddenly mandated at these local levels. If an organization or 
their accepted vendors are missing any of these training requirements, the organi-
zation may be financially liable.
4.2.2 Best practice trainings
Training based on current best practices is hard to assess because best practices in 
cybersecurity mean different things to different people and organizations. Training 
based on best practices is really subjective. Typically in the USA, organizations follow 
NIST and the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) guidance [14, 29]; 
however, still no industry-wide standards exist for exactly what best practices entail.
4.3 Service provider requirements
Service providers and vendors may be subject to different potential cyberse-
curity risk requirements than the actual provider or covered entity. If a covered 
entity works with a service provider, it should have proper agreements and risk 
mitigations in place. Two major sources of such agreements are: business associate 
agreements (BAAs) and other agreements, such as non-disclosure agreements. Let 
us examine both in the following subsections.
4.3.1 Business associate agreements (BAAs)
Historically, services providers (or business associates) working with a covered 
entity’s sensitive patient data should have properly formed BAAs in place prior to 
releasing sensitive data or have a well-formed written legal justification as to why 
no such BAAs exist. Many HIPAA-covered entities still report breaches where a 
properly formed BAA was not in place. In such cases, all parties may be considered 
responsible for the breach by the HHS OCR in the USA.
4.3.2 Non-disclosure agreements and/or other agreements
Business partners may negotiate many different types of agreements and/or 
partner requirements for their data and products. One popular agreement in health-
care and healthcare research is non-disclosure agreements (NDA). Such agreements 
require parties not to release information without prior approval. In such a case, 
malware that makes NDA-protected data public by releasing it on a popular web 
application du jour, as well as its actual authors, could be faulted to violate the NDA. 
Cases that fall into this category can have many different negative outcomes, such 
as legal ramifications, reputational damage, among others.
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In addition to NDAs, other Federal or organizational legal regulations may 
require risk assessments and other services or service-level agreements (SLAs). 
Similarly, the GDPR requires entities exposed to unauthorized access to notify 
affected breached individuals within a short timeframe. Violations to such agree-
ments can have extremely negative consequences to the healthcare entities.
4.4 Application and system requirements
Application and system security are typically measured through certifications 
(e.g., International Organization for Standardization or other sources) or from 
internal tests prior to product release. HIPAA requires security assessments for 
systems and applications managing ePHI. Organizations can either develop their 
own methodologies to communicate risk that are acceptable by covered entities, or 
the entities themselves can ask to perform such probability assessments for adverse 
events. When the covered entity is performing the assessment, they must carefully 
obtain legal authorization to do so in most cases. In general, Information System 
silos prevent considering a full-threat landscape for the technical component with 
the legal, budget, and business use cases. Additionally, digital assessments may 
be filed for HHS OCR audits into the Integrated Risk Management (IRM) system 
without updates to the overall business threat mitigations. Periodically, teams must 
carefully reassess and update the stored organizational predicted levels. In such 
cases, the assessments are more of a risk “impression” rather than an informed, 
reproducible, scientific informing on the true likelihood and impact of adverse 
events. Figure 7 [30] provides a high-level overview of different technical security 
controls reported by NIST. The following subsections identify eight subcategories 
potentially employed during a risk assessment.
4.4.1 Authentication
According to NIST [30], authentication is the process or action of proving or 
showing something to be valid. Specifically, “The authentication control provides 
the means of verifying the identity of a subject to ensure that a claimed identity is 
valid.” The OWASP Application Testing Guide [31] currently gives ten best-practice 
tests to perform for authentication: “Testing for Credentials Transported over an 
Encrypted Channel, Testing for Default Credentials, Testing for Weak Lock Out 
Mechanism, Testing for Bypassing Authentication Schema, Testing for Vulnerable 
Remember Password, Testing for Browser Cache Weaknesses, Testing for Weak 
Password Policy, Testing for Weak Security Question Answer, Testing for Weak 
Password Change or Reset Functionalities, and Testing for Weaker Authentication 
in Alternative Channel.” It is important to realize that any best-practice guide 
at-large lists top threats and vulnerabilities without perhaps listing all threats and 
vulnerabilities.
4.4.2 Session management
Session management is the data flow between endpoints—typically follow-
ing a client and server model. A web session is a series of requests and response 
transactions created by a client after authentication. In most cases, the endpoints 
communicate with a special identifier to limit re-authentications. Current best 
practices in session management include session flags, random token generation, 
and timeout intervals. The OWASP Application Testing Guide [31] currently lists 
the following eight session management tests: “Testing for Session Management 
Schema, Testing for Cookies Attributes, Testing for Session Fixation, Testing 
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for Exposed Session Variables, Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery, Testing 
for Logout Functionality, Testing Session Timeout, and Testing for Session 
Puzzling.”
4.4.3 Data-in-transport, data-at-rest, data-in-use
The protection of sensitive information is fundamental to risk management. 
Data-in-motion is the transfer of material between endpoints. This category 
changes frequently and includes industry best practices in how to transmit the 
information, such as confidentiality controls and integrity controls during message 
transmission. Once information is stored on a system, it is referred to as data-at-
rest. Lastly, data-in-use refers to messages in memory. Historically, a concern of 
data-in-use is that processes and other virtualized components could have improper 
access to the information.
4.4.4 Authorization and access control
Authorization policies define access capabilities for groups and entities. 
Access controls, sometimes referred to as permissions or privileges, are mitigat-
ing controls to enforce authorization. As such, access controls speak to lowering 
probabilities against unauthorized access, which could cause loss to data integrity, 
confidentiality, and availability. The effectiveness and the strength of unauthor-
ized access reduction depend on the correctness of the admittance control deci-
sions and the strength of entry control enforcement. The current OWASP Testing 
Framework [31] promotes the testing of four key elements in this security area: 
“Testing Directory Traversal File Include, Testing for Bypassing Authorization 
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4.4.5 Auditing and monitoring
Systems and applications should create records for auditing and monitoring. 
Specifically, archives should be generated before and after critical functions take 
place. These logs are stored in the system/server backend for regulatory require-
ments, performance indicators and other analytics. Different components are 
typically checked during risk management.
4.4.6 Injection and input vulnerabilities
Injections and input vulnerabilities enable maliciously crafted code to change 
the underlying intended behavior of a system or application. The OWASP Testing 
Guide [31] currently lists eighteen common best practice tests, including SQL/
NoSQL injection, Cross Site Scripting (XSS), and HTTP injection attacks, 
among others.
4.5 Organizational control requirements
At the organizational-level, controls such as policies, procedures, physical 
security and financial budgeting should be considered during an assessment. 
However, these components of risk management can be managed by entirely differ-
ent entities.
4.5.1 Policies and procedures
Organizations should have policies in place [32] at technical, physical, and 
administrative levels, which are repetitively and consistently followed to avoid 
different legal ramifications (e.g., from valid discrimination cases to data breaches). 
Standard operating procedures (SOPs) should also be in place and specifically 
in writing [32]. Specific procedures, which must be in place at the federal level, 
include business continuity and disaster recovery plans.
4.5.2 Physical and environmental security
This component describes the physical and environmental security aspects of 
the system, if any, which are requirements in the United States Federal HIPAA laws. 
Physical security encompasses the physical environment to lower the probability of 
a threat occurring in spaces such as public, private, and shared. It also includes ways 
to protect organizations from fire and other environmental concerns affecting risk.
4.5.3 Budget for adverse effects
Risk assessment traditionally includes developing a budget for adverse effects, 
such as in the Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR) quantitative uncertainty 
analysis model. Many organizations are not storing-up financial resources in accor-
dance with the uncertain probability being generated to pay for patient identity 
protections. Digital Guardian [33] has various reports on current costs per record; 
the costs vary with time. Simply indicating that a system is vulnerable to CSRF may 
really have no budgetary ramification under certain other conditions. Thus, prob-
ability of cost concerns inform on the overall organizational probability of concerns 
and insurance.
The HHS has historically been responsible for enforcing the Privacy and 
Security Rules of HIPAA [34]. For most HIPAA covered entities, the HHS OCR 
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enforcement of the Privacy Rule began April 14, 2003, and the Security Rule began 
on April 20, 2005. The web portal currently lists government corrective action plans 
detailing the causes of potential violations of the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules. 
Notably, in October 2020, the OCR posted four announcements, most with either 
sub-cases or multi-breaches, of case settlement with potential corrective action 
plans for violations to the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules.
5. A risk assessment library
Schmeelk [26] contributed a new open source risk assessment library example to 
enable researchers, penetration testers, risk assessment managers and institutions to 
further expand on a consistent risk-assessment findings library with their policies, 
procedures, organizational controls and legal requirements. As noted in the research 
bug libraries, dictionaries are being maintained by large organizations but do not 
include risk-assessment findings, thus complicating risk-management methods. As 
cited, during experience with internal audits risk assessment, language made analy-
sis next to impossible. For example, modern natural language processing methods 
would need to take place on penetration tests to evaluate assessment reports among 
different assessors, each applying different methodologies and terminologies.
5.1 Example risk assessment frameworks
Currently, assessment frameworks are entirely intra-organization. In addition, 
accessing patient databases is impossible—luckily—in the USA due to HIPAA. That 
said, NIST has guidance on developing an actual risk-assessment process [14]. 
However, NIST 800–30, as seen in Figure 5, does not actually specify threat source, 
threat event, actual vulnerabilities, or impact. The actual language used to describe 
these components is entirely left up to each organization to develop. Even worse, 
each risk assessor on the team may, in fact, describe these components differently 
(i.e., use entirely different words). In such cases, making any kind of accurate 
meta-analysis about the organizational risk is entirely impossible. Therefore, we 
argue that risk assessment frameworks need a standardized library to describe the 
identified risk.
5.2 Example findings library
An open-source library example from Schmeelk [26] is seen in Figure 8 apply-
ing an example-consistent risk language. The library needs to be expanded from 
industry working groups, similarly to MITER’s CWE and NIST’s BF.
Some important elements for language specification and risk clarification 
are seen in Figure 8 [26]; they are the following: vulnerability short descriptive 
name, vulnerability expanded description, techniques to remediate or mitigate 
the vulnerability, estimated likelihood factors, estimated impact factors, related 
organizational policies/standards, related NIST Controls, related HIPAA regula-
tory requirements, other related legal requirements such as non-disclosure agree-
ments, and estimated breach cost factors for insurance and related required patient 
identity-theft protection costs/notifications.
These categories listed in the prototype can arguably be expanded or removed. 
Historically, vulnerability standardization libraries [20–22] are maintained by 
major organizations (e.g. MITER) and/or government entities (e.g. NIST). Based on 
healthcare operation needs, we developed the following descriptions of the proto-
type categories.
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5.2.1 Standardizing the actual risk vulnerability and remediation language
The vulnerability column summarizes an identified system, data communica-
tion, or application weakness. The vulnerability description column gives a com-
munity-agreed-on weakness description. The remediation column briefly explains 
known techniques to remediate or mitigate the identified vulnerability.
5.2.2 Standardizing the actual risk likelihood and impact language
The likelihood column provides standardized language for estimating the prob-
ability of the identified vulnerability exploitation given different threats. Currently 
every organization makes their own likelihood estimates. Organizations on differ-
ent “sides of the physical street” with identical systems and surrounding mitigat-
ing controls, can label the risk likelihood entirely uniquely. The impact category 
approximates potential resulting consequence levels in the event a vulnerability or 
finding is realized.
5.2.3 Standardizing the actual risk associated with policies and NIST controls
Historically, organizations should develop policies and standards to help the 
organization frame their own cybersecurity stance. The NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework [35] (the NIST CSF Tool is seen in Figure 9) is one useful guide for 
developing an organizational cybersecurity posture and policies/standards.
The category in Figure 8, risk assessment library for the NIST controls, is rel-
evant to mapping mitigating controls to well-known NIST vendor agnostic controls. 
NIST regularly updates the NIST SP 800–30 [14] to account for industry trends.
5.2.4 Standardizing the actual risk to HIPAA requirements
As Security and Privacy Rules of HIPAA are major and enforceable regulatory 
legislation in the United States, the related column in the library connects the find-
ings to potential HIPAA regulations. This mapping informs the risk-management 
process when required regulatory elements are entirely missing or are in jeopardy.
5.2.5 Standardizing the actual risk to other industry-specific regulations
Other regulations, such as PCI compliance [27], The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
of 2002 [36], FTC requirements, service-level agreements (SLAs), state data breach 
laws [29], and research non-disclosure agreements, can also play their roles in risk 
Figure 8. 
Risk assessment library prototype.
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management. For example, SOX “is mandatory. ALL organizations, large and small, 
MUST comply [36].” Organizations allowing customers to pay with credit cards 
may directly or indirectly be under PCI compliance. The column other-related-legal 
provides benchmark connections to other generic requirements from these related 
regulations.
5.2.6 Standardizing the actual budget to estimate breach-associated costs
The column on budget provides approximate figures for breach and regula-
tion violation ramifications. For example, in 2019, Facebook [37] famously 
announced a proactive budget appropriation of $3B with futuristic plans to 
pay off financial penalties related to regulatory breaches. Surprisingly, in some 
recent healthcare insurance cases, insurance companies have denied financial 
payouts for healthcare entity victims for malware-related concerns under “Act 
of Nature” clauses. Such cases of significant financial losses, where healthcare 
entities are “on their own” for financially responding to the subsequent effects of 
the malware or breach, can possibly lead to the healthcare entity’s going out of 
business.
5.3 Performance metrics for an assessment risk framework library
There do exist libraries for software development concerns and known vulner-
abilities such as the NIST NVD, NIST Bug Framework, and MITER’s CWE. They 
assess their performance. MITER provides an analysis of how the library can 
be used by stakeholders; however, no formal assessment methodologies exist. 
Assessing a library framework for performance would be like trying to assess the 
performance of a spoken language. MITER [38] currently lists the following stake-
holders of their weakness enumeration (i.e., framework or library): assessment 
vendors and customers, software developers and, customers, academic researchers, 
applied vulnerability researchers, refined vulnerability information (RVI) provid-
ers, educators, and specialized communities.
According to Schmeelk [26], the library is currently prototyped as a spreadsheet, 
similarly to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Reference Tool spreadsheet repre-
sentation [35]. Currently, each sheet of the spreadsheet refers to specific domains 
of findings that can be identified during a risk-assessment process. For example, 
weakness in the physical, technical, or administrative security requirements would 
each fall on different spreadsheet pages. In addition, each of these three domains 
can be further broken into subdomains.
Figure 9. 
NIST cybersecurity framework reference tool [35].
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5.4 Benefits from a standardized risk-assessment framework library
Currently organizations are developing their own personal language for describ-
ing risk. In fact, many risk assessors within the organizations can actually employ 
their own personal language. When third-party audits and internal audits transpire, 
there is no way to assess the risk across the risk-assessment reports. For example, 
one risk-assessor employee could identify a vulnerability as cross-site scripting; 
whereas, another may document an XSS vulnerability. If the risk has been described 
differently by all employees, it becomes impossible to identify how many cross-site 
scripting vulnerabilities really exist within the organization. Hence, the meta-anal-
ysis of risk is entirely flawed. As such, it will be improperly conveyed to insurance 
companies and third-party auditors. Currently, the only way to develop a unified 
understanding of the risk is to first develop ontologies of potential words used to 
describe the risk. Then, perhaps aggregate meta-statistics about the organization 
can be developed by using natural language processing methods on the written 
reports. For example, modern natural language processing methods would need 
to take place on penetration tests to evaluate assessment reports among different 
assessors, each applying different methodologies and terminologies. As such, most 
insurance companies and third-party auditors are taking large chances on organiza-
tions who really do not understand their own cybersecurity concerns.
5.5 Improvements made by introducing a standardized risk library
Currently, there are no other relevant approaches where the risk language is 
standardized other than the vulnerability language frameworks of MITER and 
NIST. This lack of standardized risk language remains a major gap in risk analysis. 
Schmeelk [26] reports on an analysis for the prototype risk library and connects the 
library to New York State (NYS) Information Technology Security (ITS) Policies 
[39]. Standardizing the language used during risk assessments is essential for 
both internal and external factors. First, if a risk-related case ever goes to court, 
the phrasing of the risk could play a role in the court verdict. For example, if a 
business chooses to accept a finding where “unauthorized access” was identified 
during a risk assessment, the organization may be responsible for accepting the 
risk. Second, when an organization whose assessments have been written using any 
plethora of words is trying to collect internal metrics, characterizing the current 
state of cybersecurity within the organization is nearly impossible. This would be 
a useful application for Natural Language Processing (NLP), trying to character-
ize quantitatively exact numbers of password violations, XSS, SQL injection, and 
other findings. Without standardization, knowing at any time an organizational 
stance on cybersecurity becomes next to impossible. In addition, remediation 
efforts and risk mitigation efforts are significantly hindered by text-based risk 
assessments which do not conform to standards. Lastly, if every organization’s 
employees compose/compile/develop their own libraries, there will be no way to 
properly coordinate with insurance companies for breach budgeting. Sadly, without 
any standardization or proper planning, organizations may learn “the hard way” 
that they are entirely financially responsible for cleaning up a major data breach or 
ransomware attack.
5.6 Industry concerns addressed by a standardized risk library
The United States and the world are adopting, either explicitly or implicitly, 
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adopted across the world at an equally unprecedented rate. In fact, each of the 50 
United States and “the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin 
Islands have enacted legislation requiring private or governmental entities to notify 
individuals of security breaches of information involving personally identifiable 
information [29].” Each state law is potentially different from the other state laws, 
further complicating situations involving out-of-state patients. Most organizations 
have adopted Integrated Risk Management (IRM) solutions, but many of these 
solutions require extreme customization from clients. In addition, not every-
one in the organization has an overall “view” of the organizational risks. Since 
Information Systems (IS) trends remain in silos [40], coordinating risk among 
the different healthcare departments and all the IS sectors is difficult. In addition, 
entities within an organization that sign off on risk, typically referred to as system 
owners, may find an imbalance on the risk they must accept on the behalf of the 
business. Then, as system owners leave or retire from an organization, subsequent 
new hires may not fully understand the risks inherited with their positions. In fact, 
new hires in security high-level positions often ask the organization for audits prior 
to taking, or during the first year of, a new job. That way they can benchmark the 
inherited risks.
6. Conclusions
As risk management evolves, so do the needs for risk communication and risk 
articulation. Healthcare entities need to know, in advance, exactly what their 
insurance covers involving privacy and security risks. Patients need to be aware of 
identity theft concerns if their personal identifying information (PII) is breached 
and sold in alternative marketplaces. Technology in the healthcare-related infra-
structure is here to stay; ultimately, society will need to standardize how they deal 
with and respond to privacy and cybersecurity risks. The sooner we adopt a frame-
work of actual privacy and security violations and corrections, the better industry 
will be able to communicate and mitigate risks—especially in healthcare where 
human life is at ultimately at risk.
© 2021 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
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